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INTRODUCTION
After agreeing to write this essay on the future of equal employment
opportunity law in the twenty-first century, I was at a loss how to begin. In
fact, I regretted consenting to such an endeavor. I toyed with clever and
not so clever ideas for an opening paragraph, only to discover that more
than twenty years ago, Professor Brainerd Currie bad virtually preempted
that approach in an article he wrote for a symposium on the future of law.
Professor Currie began his article saying: "No man ever leaped clear-eyed
from his bed, crying 'Go to! I will write a paper on the future of legal
education,' and proceeded to do so forthwith."'
Perhaps part of the problem is attempting to write about the future,
but Professor Currie did find a way to write his article. For me, the
unifying idea for this essay on the future of equal employment opportunity
law came when the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke? I realize that the long-
awaited Bakke, the so-called "reverse discrimination" case, came almost
exactly thirty-seven years after the event I consider the real beginning of
equal employment law: President Roosevelt's issuance of Executive Order
Number 8802. 3 The first executive order prohibiting job discrimination
and the Bakke decision, although the latter is an education case testing the
modern concept of affirmative action, are the first and latest steps in the
development of equal employment law. The first is a recognition of the
problem; the second involves the conflict in attempting to resole it.
Executive Order Number 8802 and the Bakke case do two things: they
recognize the problems of discrimination and define the historical parame-
ters of equal employment law. Both are important events, and it is
important to introduce the reader to them.
It was on June 25, 1941 that President Roosevelt reluctantly issued
Executive Order Number 8802. A. Philip Randolph, the president of the
predominantly black Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, had threat-
ened a march of 10,000 people on Washington to protest job discrimina-
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tion in the defense industries, and he later raised the number to 100,000. 4
Roosevelt feared the possible international reaction to such a demonstra-
tion. When he was unable to dissuade Randolph from demonstrating,
Roosevelt issued Executive Order Number 8802. It prohibited job
discrimination on the basis of race, creed, color, religion, and national
origin in the defense industries, and it established the Fair Employment
Practices Committee (FEPC) to carry out the purposes of the order.5
The order was significant despite its limitations. The President's Fair
Employment Practices Committee had no enforcement power and almost
no staff; it necessarily relied on publicity and moral suasion. Further-
more, the order was based on risky constitutional authority and faced
congressional hostility. Even so, the prohibition of job discrimination
spawned hope in millions of black Americans for a national fair employ-
ment law that would usher in a new millenium.
6
Executive Order Number 8802 was a brave beginning.7 Although its
only lasting significance may have been the use of Presidential power to
address discrimination, virtually all of the law worthy of the label "equal
opportunity law" has been created since 1941.8 Progress from that
beginning has not been easy, and the federal equal employment laws and
orders that followed the first executive order were not given a firm
statutory base until the passage of the Civil Rights Act in 1964.9 Moreover,
despite numerous opportunities,'0 the Supreme Court has yet to rule
squarely on the role of affirmative action relief in employment cases.
The latest step in the development of equal employment law occurred
on June 28, 1978, when the Supreme Court issued its decision in Regents of
the University of California v. Bakke." The case concerned the right to be
admitted to a state medical school. The school had a special admissions
program that considered the disadvantaged status of minority students
4. D. LOCKARD, TOWARD EQUAL OPPORTUNITY 17 (1968).
5. For discussions of fair employment practice committees, see M. SOVERN, LEGAL RESTRAINTS
ON RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT9-17, 103-142(1966). See also P. NORGREN &S. HILu.,
TOWARD FAIR EMPLOYMENT 149-79 (1964); L. KESSELMAN, TiIE SOCIAL POLITICS OF FEPC (1948).
6. Id.
7. A brave beginning had also been made between 1863 and 1871 with the Emancipation
Proclamation and the antebellum civil rights laws, presently codified at 42 U.S.C. 1981 & 1983(1970).
However, by 1875 virtually all of those earlier laws had been eviscerated by interpretations of the
Supreme Court.
8. See Jones, The Transformation of Fair Employment Practices Policies, in FEDERAL POLICIES
AND WORKER STATUS SINCE THE THIRTIES 159 (1976).
9. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000h (1970).
10. Rios v. Steamfitters Local 638,501 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1974); NAACP v. Allen, 493 F.2d 614,
617-19 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Local 212, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 472 F.2d 634,635-36
(6th Cir. 1973); Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315, 327-28 (8th Cir. 1971). cert. denied, 406 U.S.
950 (1972); Porcelli v. Titus, 431 F.2d 1254 (3rd Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 944 (1971). The
Supreme Court has recently agreed to hear a case dealing with the role of affirmative action relief in
employment cases. Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 563 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1977),
rehearing denied, 571 F.2d 337 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. granted, 47 U.S.L.W. 3401 (U.S. December 11,
1978).
11. 98 S. Ct. 2733 (1978).
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and reserved sixteen places out of a class of one hundred for them. Mr.
Bakke charged reverse discrimination when he was not admitted under the
regular admissions program for white applicants.2
Bakke was to be a landmark decision. Although the case was in the
field of medical education, most observers anticipated that the decision
would have significance for employment law and other fields where
affirmative action was an issue. Announcement of the Bakke opinion was
marked by enormous public interest and media exposure, but after the
fanfare had quieted and the decision was read, it was clear only that Bakke
had prevailed; he had been ordered admitted to medical school. The
decision left most of the critical issues for a later day. The most critical
issue in the case was the future of any affirmative action, whether based
upon a judicial determination or upon administrative or legislative
initiatives. Contentions regarding the choice of constitutional doctrine to
support or reject affirmative action, as well as conditions and limitations
upon the use of the concept, saturated the briefs for and against Bakke, If
Bakke was to prevail, what, if anything, could be done to deal with the
realities of underutilization of minorities in our social and economic
endeavors? How are minorities to move into the positions from which
they have been excluded? How do we balance minority and majority
rights? In retrospect, it was unrealistic to have expected the Bakke
decision to answer these questions. But the future demands that they be
answered.
The answers we give will determine the future of equal employment
opportunity law. But before turning to look ahead, a brief sketch of the
years between Executive Order Number 8802 and the Bakke decision
seems appropriate, for those years form the basis for what prophecies can
be made.
I. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNIrY LAW-
THE EARLY YEARS: 1941-1961
There is not room to recount the social, economic, and historic events
that shaped this country from 1941 through 1961 in an essay of this
magnitude. Suffice it to say that the span was marked by great national
and international turmoil. Those years included a major war and a so-
called police action, the formation of the United Nations and near
continuous political, social, and economic conflict. It was also the
beginning of "Negro revolt" on the domestic front.' 3
It seems reasonable to conclude that the political and social dynamics
of this period contributed to the emergence of equal employment oppor-
tunity law. The first strains of equal employment law were the Presidential
12. Id. at 2741-42.
13. L. LOMAX, THE NEGRO REVOLT (1962).
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prohibition of discrimination, the development of concepts of what
constituted unlawful employment discrimination, and the application of
the constitutional concepts of equal protection and state action to discrim-
inatory acts.
President Roosevelt's issuance of Executive Order Number 8802 was
a creative effort to grapple with employment discrimination. The Presi-
dent's executive order rested on three sources of potential legal and
constitutional authority: (1) the power of the President during wartime as
commander in chief; (2) the obligation the President has as chief executive
to take care that the laos and the Constitution are faithfully executed;
and (3) the procurement power of the government. The third suggested
source of Presidential authority had arguable support in the Supreme
Court's decision in Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., a case that concerned
contract terms under the Public Contracts Act of 1936.14 Perkins v.
Lukens asserted that the government, like any other contractor, was
entitled to impose the terms and conditions under which it was going to do
business. Some might consider this a rather extravagant assertion. In
fact, none of the three sources of legal and constitutional authority had
been so clearly litigated in 1941 as to be a strong base for the revolutionary
proposition that the President, acting for the federal government, could
prohibit employment discrimination in private employment.
The legal concepts of unlawful discrimination used during this time
were less novel and less far reaching. Two major theories were used. The
first required a deliberate, intentional act to injure an individual because of
that individual's membership in a race or other group, by conduct that was
tortious and malicious, perhaps criminal. The second concept utilized
constitutional notions of fourteenth amendment equal protection. The
deliberate, intentional unequal treatment of a person because of his or her
membership in a race or religion was frowned upon under the law. The
difficulty with either concept was that its reach was limited to official "state
conduct"; it did not cover private discrimination.
It should be pointed out that these definitions of discrimination as injury
or unequal treatment of the individual were also carried over to the
President's executive order. The order provided for investigation of
individual complaints, and redress or remedy to reach intentional, mali-
cious, and unequal treatment as "wrongs" under the executive order.
Racially discriminatory treatment accorded minority employees by a
labor union was proscribed by the developing duty of fair representation.
The doctrine was first enunciated by the Supreme Court in Steele v.
Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co.15 In that case, the Court required a
railroad union "to represent non-union or minority union members of the
14. Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113, 127 (1940). Public Contracts Act of June 30,
1936, Pub. L. No. 74-846, 49 Stat. 2036 (1936).
15. Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
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craft without hostile discrimination, fairly, impartially, and in good
faith."' 6  Although the duty of fair representation rests on a
constitutional-governmental action concept, the Court found it unneces-
sary to reach the constitutional proposition. The Court determined that
under the governing statutes, 7 invidious discrimination was not permit-
ted. The indirect method of reaching that conclusion was that the union
and the employer operated under the law and owed their power and
position to the law; attached to the privilege and power granted by the law
were implied governmental constraints upon invidious discrimination.
Most civil rights law during this time was clearly based on an idea of
constitutional-governmental action; advocates attempted to reach private
discriminatory conduct by establishing the facts of governmental action.
This required changes in the concepts of discrimination and governmen-
tal action. The infamous "separate but equal" proposition of Plessy*' v.
Ferguson" was an application of constitutional concepts to challenged
governmental action. It was not until the celebrated school dese§regation
cases of Brown v. Board of Education'9 and Bolling v. Sharpe' that the
Court determined that separate was inherently unequal. Furthermore, it
was in 1961, in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority,21 that the
Supreme Court started to unravel the fact situations in which a
government agency is so entwined with private discrimination that private
discrimination becomes state action, subject to constitutional scrutiny.
As a final note for this period, it should be mentioned that during the
1940s various states enacted fair employment practice laws that banned
private discrimination. When the laws were challenged, the Supreme
Court found such action to be within state authority; the state laws
prohibiting discrimination did not unconstitutionally infringe upon pri-
vate conduct.22
II. SMALL STEPS-GIANT LEAPS: 1961-1971
Although attempts to get at private discrimination by establishing
governmental action continued, two new concepts emerged during the
next ten years that were significant additions to the battle against employ-
ment discrimination. Unlike earlier theories of unlawful discrimination
that necessitated a showing of intentional and malicious discrimination,
these concepts were not solely concerned with discriminatory motive. The
first is the modern concept of affirmative action. The second emphasized
16. Id. at 204.
17. Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-163, 181-188 (1970).
18. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
19. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
20. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
21. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
22. Railway Mail Ass'n v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88 (1945). See also D. LOCKARD, supra note 4, at
19-23.
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the consequences of employment practices, as opposed to the intent with
which they were undertaken.
The concept of affirmative action began with Executive Order
Number 10925 issued by President Kennedy.23 The order required that
recipients of government contracts take affirmative action to ensure
equality of employment opportunity, without regard to questions of guilt
or specific entitlement to relief. Like most great innovations, it was a
simple proposition. Like most successful innovations in the area of social
behavior, it was an evolutionary step; its legal underpinnings were rooted
deep in the history of Anglo-American law.
The basic concept of affirmative action comes from equity. It is no
more than a fundamental fairness proposition-the court should have the
tools necessary to grant complete make-whole relief. The concept is old
and comfortable in Anglo-American law. Much of our social legislation
grants the court or agency broad authority to remedy any injury found to
have occurred by such affirmative action as may be necessary to carry out
the purposes of the law.
A basis existed for the utilization of affirmative action relief in the
equal employment arena. Richard Nixon, as Vice President, had chaired
an Eisenhower Committee on Government Contracts. In his final report,
Nixon asserted that the problems facing America were not generated by
vicious people intentionally discriminating on the basis of race, but rather
by the failure of employers to take positive action to eradicate the legacy of
the past.24 A moment's reflection upon that conclusion suggests the
necessary remedy-a program divorced from concepts of guilt or injury,
but addressed to the general historic condition. In retrospect, President
Kennedy's affirmative action initiative appears to be a natural response to
the condition recognized by the Nixon committee.
The second equal employment development of this period, which
placed emphasis upon the effects of employment practices as indicia of
discrimination, came after the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
and a Supreme Court decision concerning the Act. The importance of the
Act was not appreciated until the Supreme Court decided Griggs v. Duke
Power Co.25 With that decision, it became clear that Congress had not only
established a statutory base for a national equal employment law but had
also approached the problem of job discrimination with a reasonably new
concept-whether the effects of employment practices were dis-
criminatory.
Griggs v. Duke Power dealt with the use of written tests and a high
school education requirement for job entry and mobility. Blacks failed
23. Exec. Order No. 10925, §§ 301-314, 3 C.F.R. 448 (1959-63 Comp.) (1961).
24. See PATTERN FOR PROGRESS, FINAL REPORT TO PRESIDENT EIsEIIoWER FROM TIlE
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS (1960). See also P. NORGREN & S. HILL, supra note 5.
25. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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the test at a significantly higher rate than whites and fewer blacks had high
school diplomas. The Court concluded that tests with such a disparate
impact could not be used unless they had a manifest relationship to ability
to do the job. In fnaking the decision, the Court declared that "Congress
directed the thrust of the Act to the consequences of employment practices,
not simply the motivation. 26 Thus, an important "effects test" concept of
discrimination was added to the field of equal employment."
An attempt to discuss the many employment cases decided under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act would overburden this essay.28 Most of the
Court's decisions apply existing principles to facts under the new law
rather than introduce conceptual novelties, as in Duke Power. One
further Supreme Court decision is worthy of comment. In Jones v. Alfred
H. Mayer Co.,29 the Court resuscitated the long dormant section I of the
Civil Rights Act of 1866,30 now codified in sections 1981 and 1982 of Title
42 of the United States Code. The Court held that section 1982 barred
private, as well as public, racial discrimination in the sale or rental of
property. The Court found that section 1982 was enacted pursuant to
congressional authority under the thirteenth amendment to eradicate
"badges" of slavery, whether imposed by private or state action. After
Jones, it seemed certain that the section 1981 ban on racial discrimination
in the making and enforcement of contracts would be extended to
proscribe private discriminatory action in the employment contract area,
and the Supreme Court has confirmed that view." Thus, the Court in
Jones did not invoke a new concept of discrimination, but its reappraisal of
existing theory and clarification of constitutional authority and congres-
sional intent provided an additional means of prohibiting employment
discrimination.
Employment discrimination was also being fought by state and
federal governments during this time. The efforts of the federal govern-
ment in this area, the fruits of which were to be challenged in the Bakke
case as reverse discrimination, began in the construction industry. Con-
struction employer associations and unions unsuccessfully challenged the
26. Id. at 432.
27. See Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. Cm. L. REv. 235 (1971).
Two years later in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), the Supreme Court
reemphasized its effects-test concept and added a determination of the order and allocations of proof
applicable to private nonclass action suits of employment discrimination. Significantly, the Court
cited an article by Alfred W. Blumrosen in the case, Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise:Griggsv. Duke
Power Co. and the Concept of Employment Discrimination, 71 Micii. L. REV. 59 (1972). In his article,
Professor Blumrosen had discussed the implications of the Duke Power case and the effects test. The
Court's favorable citation to the Blumrosen analysis verified the perception that a new concept of
employment discrimination had been added by the 1964 federal statute as it was interpreted by the
Court.
28. See Jones, The Development of the Law Under Title VII Since 1965: Implications of the
Law, 30 RUTGERS L. REV. 1 (1976).
29. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
30. Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (1866).
31. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S, 454, 459-60 (1975).
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government's efforts to impose goals or quotas to ensure minority partici-
pation in federally-assisted construction projects. The most notable case
was Contractors Association of Eastern Pennsylvania v. Secretary of
Labor,32 primarily because it was the first in a string of cases that sup-
ported the government's efforts.33
Although the construction industry provides a modest number of
jobs, efforts to secure employment for blacks in that industry spurred the
further implementation of affirmative action programs. The government's
success in litigating these cases made it possible to apply the concepts
developed in construction, notably affirmative action plans, to a wide
range of employers doing business with the government.
III. THE PERIOD OF TESTING AND CLARIFICATION-
LIMITATION OF THE NEW EQUAL
EMPLOYMENT CONCEPTS: 1971-1978
It is inevitable that when new courses are charted there is a period of
adjustment. Adjustment may not be the appropriate word, but since our
legal process rests on specific facts fitted to a general rule, once a new rule
has been set forth, new arguments are made to test its metes and bounds.
During the short period following the emergence of affirmative action
programs and the consequences or effects tests, most of the Court's
contributions have consisted of drawing lines of limitation or clarifica-
tion.
The clarifications and limitations of equal employment opportunity
law under Title VII can be seen in two major cases- Washington v. Davis34
and International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States.35  The
brave new pronouncements of Duke Power were limited by the Supreme
Court's decision in Washington v. Davis. In that case the Court made it
clear that the "effects test" did not apply to cases brought under the
Constitution. It was still necessary to prove discriminatory purpose or
intent in constitutional cases. The Court also seemed to take a less
demanding stance in assessing whether an employment test that excluded a
32. 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971).
33. See Associated General Contractors of Mass., Inc. v. Altshuler, 490 F.2d 9 (Ist Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 957 (1974); United States v. Carpenters Local 169,457 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied,409 U.S. 851(1972); Weinerv. Cuyahoga Community College Dist., 19 OhioSt. 2d 35,249
N.E.2d 907 (1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1004(1970). See Rios v. Steamfitters Local 638, 501 F.2d 622
(2d Cir. 1974), for a discussion of further references. For law review treatment, see Jones, The
Bugaboo of Employment Quotas, 1970 Wis. L. REv. 341 (1970); Leiken, Preferential Treatment in the
Skilled Building Trades: An Analysis of the Philadelphia Plan, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 84 (1970);
Comment, The Philadelphia Plan: Equal Employment Opportunity in the Construction Trades, 6
COLUM. J. LAw &Soc. PROB. 187(1970); Comment, The Philadelphia Plan:A Studyin the Dynamics
of Executive Power, 39 U. CHI. L. REV. 723 (1972); Note, The Legality of the "Revised Philadelphia
Plan," 30 MD. L. REv. 114 (1970).
34. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
35. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
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disproportionate number of minority applicants was sufficiently job
related to be deemed valid under Title VII.
36
The Supreme Court's determination in International Brotherhood Qf
Teamsters v. United States37 imposed a more surprising limitation. The
Court held that Congress did not intend the standards enunciated in Duke
Power38 to apply to otherwise bona fide seniority programs. The Court
concluded that Congress had granted a measure of immunity to seniority
systems in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Therefore, the effects
test, which would otherwise make the neutral consequences of the seniority
systems illegal discrimination, was not to be applied.
Washington v. Davis and International Brotherhood of Teamsters v.
United States appear to have limited the scope of the effects test and
interpretation of Title VII law. There was, however, an additional
element in Washington v. Davis that appeared hopeful. In that case the
Supreme Court asserted that any inference of intent to discriminate by the
District of Columbia was more than met by the successful operation of the
District's race specific affirmative action program. This assertion seemed
to contain the seeds of ultimate approval for affirmative action programs.
The preceding two cases set in place major Title VII developments,
but when Congress changed the law in 1972, there were new issues to be
litigated. Congress extended the coverage of Title VII, making it
applicable to both state and local entities. The new law also provided
statutory guarantees for federal employees.
The most significant issue to be litigated as a result of these changes
may have been the right of individuals to sue the states, despite the
strictures of the eleventh amendment on the jurisdiction of federal courts
to hear citizen complaints. In Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer39 the Supreme Court
held that an individual subjected to employment discrimination by a state
could sue that state in federal court, pursuant to an express statutory
authorization in the Civil Rights Act, which was held to be constitutional.
The Court declared that to the extent the eleventh amendment was a bar,
it had been repealed pro tanto by the subsequently enacted fourteenth
amendment; the fourteenth amendment clearly provided a basis on which
Congress could enact legislation granting federal court jurisdiction of
actions by citizens against their own state or by citizens against another
state.
Another development in employment discrimination law was the
Supreme Court's holding in McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation
Co.40 The Court decided that Title VII and section 1981 applied to
discrimination against whites as well as against blacks.
36. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 248-52 (1976).
37. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
38. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). See also United Airlines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553 (1977).
39. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
40. 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
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Most of the history of equal opportunity law has been discussed in
terms of racial discrimination because racial discrimination has been and
remains a major problem in American society. But it is also important to
remember other types of employment discrimination. The two I will
touch upon here are sex and religious discrimination.4'
The Supreme Court has found discrimination on the basis of sex to be
violative of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment and
due process requirements of the fifth amendment.42 In deciding those
cases, the Court has developed a selective way of viewing laws that classify
on the basis of sex. The Court appears to use a sliding concept of
scrutiny-the Court will sustain laws that it views as compensating for
historical deprivation; it will strike down laws that maintain sex
stereotypes to the disadvantage of women.
The Supreme Court's selective use of existing judicial rules and
concepts to deal with sex discrimination under the Constitution has not
been wholly satisfactory. Classifications based upon sex have not been
subjected to "strict scrutiny" analysis under the equal protection clause, 3
as is the case with classifications based upon race. Feminists' continued
efforts to secure an equal rights amendment reveal substantial unhappiness
with the Court's treatment of sex.
But sex discrimination claims have fared better under the Constitu-
tion than under Title VII. In General Electric Co. v. Gilbert,44 the Court
concluded that Congress did not intend to make the exclusion of
pregnancy disability from an employee disability plan a violation of Title
VII. If the Court had stopped with that rationale, the opinion would have
been understandable. The Court, however, attempted to convince the
reader that exclusion of pregnancy from an otherwise comprehensive
disability plan was not gender-based discrimination. The argument that
pregnancy was not sex based brought howls of protest and hoots of
derision. The Court has subsequently modified its position. It has
asserted that Title VII did not permit women to be burdened by maternity
plans that deny them their accumulated seniority after a pregnancy leave of
absence, although it did not require that they be benefited with sick pay
during that leave.45 The 1978 amendments to the Civil Rights Act of 1964
have gone even further, making it unlawful for any employer to
41. This paper will not deal in detail with the development of equal employment rights for
handicapped persons, but the hope is that the law in this important area will move beyond attitudes of
condescending sympathy to an understanding of the abilities of handicapped persons and the full
utilization of their skills. Some strides have been taken toward this goal. See. e.g.,The Vocational
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 793 (Supp. III 1973).
42. Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974); Frontiero v. Richardson. 411 U.S. 677 (1973);
Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625 (1972); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (197 1). See also Cleveland Bd.
of Edue. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); Forbush v. Wallace, 405 U.S. 970 (1972).
43. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
44. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
45. Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136 (1977).
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discriminate on the basis of pregnancy in the formulation and
administration of fringe benefit programs.4 In City of Los Angeles,
Department of Water and Power v. Manhart,47 the Court decided that a
retirement plan that required women to contribute more than men because
of their longer life expectancy was sex-based discrimination in violation of
Title VII.
The area of religious discrimination under Title VII, as well as under
local law, is becoming increasingly complex. Because of first amendment
protections and the separation of church and state, religion stands on a
somewhat different footing than other invidious discrimination. The
conflicting interests in this area may all be constitutionally legitimate. At
this time, it seems apparent that the duty of the employer to accommodate
different religious beliefs is less demanding than the duty to redress alleged
race or sex discrimination, and the concepts concerning religious
discrimination are relatively less developed.4
It should be noted in concluding this discussion of the years 1971-1978
that new classes have been extended protection under employment laws.
The handicapped and Vietnam era veterans are protected by special
statutes.49 Some local jurisdictions prohibit discrimination on the basis of
sexual preference. Congress has increasingly resorted to affirmative
action requirements in other statutes, and state and local governments
have followed suit with executive orders, statutes, and ordinances.
IV. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION-THE FUTURE ON TRIAL:
THE Bakke ERA
With a brief history in place, it is time to look at the latest step in the
development of equal employment law: questioning the validity of
affirmative action. During the five years between the Supreme Court's
consideration of DeFunis v. Odegaard50 and Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke,5' the country had agonized over the desirability and
constitutionality of affirmative action as an instrument of social change.
One view of affirmative action is that it should be called reverse
discrimination. "Affirmative action" is a device to penalize the innocent
and to reward the unfortunate; it is a violation of our concepts of
individual merit and equal protection. This view is based upon the belief
that the past is past. We start afresh with the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and
all persons are equal.
46. Act ofOctober31, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555,92 Stat. 2076 (to be codified at42 U.S.C. 20000).
47. 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
48. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977).
49. See The Vocational Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 793 (Supp. Ill 1973); Vietnam
Era Veterans Readjustment Act of 1974, 38 U.S.C. § 2012 (Supp. IV 1974).
50. 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
51. 98 S. Ct. 2733 (1978).
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The alternative view of affirmative action is that we cannot start afresh
until the racial distortions that pervade our society have been removed.
Discrimination that has existed for over two centuries cannot be
eradicated by denying its existence. To eliminate racism, there must be
positive programs to remedy the present effects of past practices. In this
view, affirmative action is seen as a last ditch effort to deal with the
historical legacy of racial discrimination. It is a moral responsibility for
our society as a whole.
In dealing with societal racism, the issue of the constitutionality of
affirmative action is as significant as was the issue of separate but equal.
Bakke may not be a landmark case of the caliber of Brown v. Board of
Education,52 but the case is worth discussing in detail, both for what it said
and how it can be understood in the context of past pronouncements by the
Court.
The concept of affirmative action programs, as opposed to court-
ordered remedies, was a novel one in Bakke. Five Justices agreed that
properly designed affirmative action programs that are race conscious do
not violate the Constitution or the statute. Four Justices declined to
decide the constitutional issue. They believed that the legislative history
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 manifested the intent of Congress to be
color blind in the dispersal of federally financed benefits. Therefore, they
concluded that the affirmative action program in Bakke violated Title VI
of the Act.
It is important to understand Bakke in the context of past cases that
strengthen the arguments for the constitutionality of affirmative action.
There are significant cases that raised similar constitutional issues and in
which all the Justices indicated a favorable view of affirmative action,
including the use of numerical quotas.
In Washington v. Davis,5 3 Justices Stewart, Rehnquist and Burger
joined in a majority opinion by Justice White that seemed to accent the
legitimacy of a race specific program. The opinion stated:
Even agreeing with the District Court that the differential racial effect of Test
21 called for further inquiry, we think the District Court correcty held that
the affirmative efforts of the Metropolitan Police Department to recruit black
officers, the changing racial composition of the recruit classes and of the force
in general, and the relationship of the test to the training program negated any
inference that the Department discriminated on the basis of race or that "a
police officer qualifies on the color of his skin rather than ability."
5
'
4
The District Court had litigated a number of issues concerning the
52. 349 U.S. 294 (1954).
53. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
54. Id. at 246 (emphasis added). The district court had determined a number of issues
concerning the affirmative action program. Among those issues were questions about the appropriate
labor market for the District of Columbia and the appropriate population to govern the affirmative
action effort.
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affirmative action program. Among those issues were the appropriate
labor market area for the District of Columbia and the appropriate
population to govern the affirmative action effort.
United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey"
concerned redistricting senate and assembly seats. The Court declared
that neither the fourteenth nor the fifteenth amendment mandates any per
se rule against using racial criteria in districting and apportionment.
Furthermore, the permissible use of racial criteria in redistricting was not
confined to remedying the effects of past discriminatory apportionment or
districting. Justice White wrote the opinion and he was joined by Justice
Stevens. Justice Rehnquist joined in part. All recognized that racial
criteria may be used without violating the Constitution and that in the
voting area some numerical proportionality may be used. Even Justice
Burger, the only dissenter, recognized that reference to the racial
composition of a political unit may, under certain circumstances, serve as
"a starting point in the process of shaping a remedy."5 6
Taken together, the two cases suggest that the four Justices who ruled
in favor of Bakke on statutory grounds would go at least as far as Justice
Powell did in regard to affirmative action programs. Justice Powell
indicated that he was prepared to accept a system that took race into
account as a factor in selection and perhaps even numerical goals where
there had been an administrative or legislative determination of prior
illegal discrimination.57
V. THE FUTURE OF EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY LAW
The Bakke decision, placed in the context of other Supreme Court
cases and within the historical flow of equal employment law, provides a
basis for future projections. At the outset, it appears that administrative
or legislative employment programs will be able to use race and numerical
goals. If the goals are not structured to penalize nonminorities, they
should be able to withstand constitutional challenge. To the extent that
constitutional blessings are given to appropriate affirmative action
programs, the future of equal employment will depend less upon the
attitude of the judiciary and more upon the political will of the country.
The political will of the country to achieve a "purified republic"-a
country free of the corruption of discrimination--will determine how
quickly changes are made. In a little book that appeared in 1967, the late
Professor Arthur Ross wrote a chapter entitled, "The Negro in the
American Economy."58  Professor Ross predicted that if the rate of
55. 430 U.S. 144 (1977).
56. Id. at 185. Burger is citing his own opinion in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of
Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 25 (1971).
57. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 98 S. Ct. 2733, 2753-56 (1978).
58. Henderson, Regions, Race, and Jobs, in EMPLOYi2ENT, RACE AND POVERTY 76 (A. Ross & H.
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change of 1964 could be maintained, blacks would be fully integrated into
the occupational structure by the year 2000. That prediction now seems
too optimistic. It seems that integration has slowed, and we have been
plagued by unemployment. If, however, the problems in employment
unrelated to race could be solved, full occupational integration by the year
2025 does not seem unrealistic.
How racial integration in the work force is to take place will depend
upon the employment opportunities available. If there were continuous
full employment, the layoff problem of "last hired, first fired" that has
afflicted minority employment would disappear. Assuming equitable
distribution of minorities in the workforce, there would be occupational
integration. It is likely, however, that employment patterns of the
twentieth century will continue into the twenty-first. If there would be
periods of high employment offset by periods of high unemployment,
affirmative action programs would be necessary to overcome the problems
newer workers face in layoff situations.
Although there has not been a critical test of affirmative action in
employment before the Supreme Court, the law does not appear to stand
in the way of such programs. Looking both at the legislative history of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act and the executive order programs, it seems
reasonable to conclude that Congress intended the programs to work in
tandem. Under this analysis, affirmative action programs would not offend
the statute, and under Bakke it also appears that they would not offend the
Constitution.
The proceeding discussion assumes an optimistic, if not entirely
cloudless, future and an end to employment discrimination. That is not
the only future that can be imagined. If the lack of clarity in the Bakke
decision contributes to a chilling of affirmative action programs and if
black youth remain disproportionately unemployed, there will be black
revolt again. It is too easy to forget the anger and violence of the sixties.
The revolutionary fervor of the Black Panthers fades from memory as
their leaders run for political office and work in social programs for the
public at large. It is too easy to forget what happens when people have no
place and no chance in our society.
The tragedy is that an outbreak of anger would take forms infinitely
worse than the marches and burnings of the sixties. There are now
effective models for the use of terror as an instrument of social and
political change. It is not unrealistic to fear black counterparts of a Red
Brigade in American streets. The outcome would be repression, terrible
for blacks and destructive to the integrity of our society as a whole.
It is a risk we need not run. A clear validation by the Supreme Court
of affirmative action programs would preserve the most vital new tool to
Hill eds. 1967); Killingsworth, Negroes in the American Economy, in E.tPLO .vr, RACE A.ND
POVERTY 49 (A. Ross & H. Hill eds. 1967); Ross, 7he Negro in the American Economy, in
EMPLOYMENT, RACE AND POVERTY 3 (A. Ross & H. Hill eds. 1967).
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emerge from the twentieth century with which to attack discrimination in
the twenty-first.
The integration of minorities into the work force is a necessary
change; it seems certain there will be other changes in employment
patterns. The two that will be briefly discussed here concern the
employment of older Americans and women.
It can be predicted that the work force of the future will contain many
older Americans, and there will be changes in societal values and laws to
accommodate them. By the year 2000, fifty percent of the population is
expected to be over forty.59 There will be a dramatic increase in people
over sixty-five and a dramatic decrease in persons under twenty-five. 0  It
does not appear that there will be enough young workers to support older
workers at the present ages of retirement. 61 The prediction for an older
work force seems almost self-evident.
Social values and policies concerning age will have to be changed.
One needed change will be the removal of mandatory retirement and that
will require statutory changes and changes in constitutional interpretation.
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act,62 passed in 1967 to promote
the employment of older people, only covered workers to age sixty-five
until it was recently amended to expand coverage to age 70. In
Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia63 the Supreme Court held
that the compulsory retirement of police officers at age fifty did not violate
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. The Court's
position on age discrimination was that it did not warrant the degree of
constitutional scrutiny given to traditional invidious discrmination.
Age discrimination in employment appears to be an area in which the
law will have to keep up with social change. And although these changes
are unlikely to come easily, they seem essentially positive-society's need
for self-supporting older workers will stimulate utilization of the wisdom
and experience that has been ignored and wasted.
The role of women in the work force can also be expected to expand,
not only in terms of numbers of women working but in the level of jobs
they hold. Increasingly, both married and single women are working
through the family cycle and restrictions upon their work force par-
ticipation opportunities will be less well tolerated. 6 The Equal Pay Act of
59. Drucker & Moore, Mandatory Retirement: Past, Present and Future qf an Anachronlsmn, 5
W. ST. L. REv. 1 (1977).
60. Id.
61. HousE SELECT COMM. ON AGING, 95TH CONG., IST SESS., MANDATORY R-rlRLIENT: Tilt
SOCIAL AND HUMAN COST OF ENFORCED IDLENESS (Comm. Print 1977)
62. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1970 & Supp. V 1975), as amended by Age Discrimination in
Employment Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-256, 92 Stat. 189 (to be codified in scattered
sections of 29 U.S.C.).
63. 427 U.S. 307 (1976).
64. B. BABCOCK, A. FREEDMAN, E. NORTON & S. Ross, SEX DISCRIMINATION AND TIIE LAw 219
(1975) [hereinafter dited as B. BABCOCK].
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196365 and the Civil Rights Act of 196466 require equality for women in
employment, training, advancement, and pay. Coupled with higher
career aspirations, the laws will provide a framework for equality in
employment.
But laws against sex discrimination and high aspirations are not
enough. Equitable treatment for women will also be dependent on labor
market trends and awareness among women of human resources
demands.67 Even if jobs exist, women will need improved career
counseling and occupational training to move into jobs that have not been
traditional women's work. Women also need to continue to oppose
discriminatory employment practices. Since the Supreme Court's
treatment of sex discrimination can most charitably be described as
uneven, women must continue to challenge employment discrimination
through the political process.
For the effort required, social change seems to come slowly. But
there is change. In the waning days of the 1977 term, the Supreme Court
held that cities are suable entities under federal law.68 The Court has also
recently concluded that officials may be held liable for their misconduct
and substantially limited the immunity previously available to them.
69
Civil rights advocates can now hold cities and officials accountable for
their actions, and both decisions are likely to have significance for future
equal employment law.
As a final, overall prediction, it seems reasonable that equal
employment law of the twenty-first century will continue to remove
discriminatory barriers. However, discussing the problem of employment
discrimination in terms of law is an oversimplification. Even a brief
tracing of relationships affected by employment discrimination quickly
becomes complicated-jobs are related to training, which is related to the
quality of school, which is related to housing patterns, which are related to
economic status, and so on. In short, employment discrimination is a
pervasive societal problem. For a future of equal employment
opportunity, social change will have to occur in a multiplicity of ways.
Perhaps the most hopeful signs of change are less in the law than in the
sustained efforts of minorities and women for increased participation in
politics-local, state, and federal. As their organization, cooperation,
and political effectiveness become increasingly apparent, the laws as well
as the political priorities of government will be more responsive to their
problems.
65. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1970).
66. Id. §§ 2000e-2000h (1970).
67. B. BABCOCK, supra note 64, at 222.
68. Monell v. Department of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
69. Butz v. Economou, 98 S. Ct. 2894 (1978).
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There seems to be light at the end of the equal employment tunnel. Its
brightness will depend upon our ability as a nation in the twenty-first
century to "share the burdens of past discrimination" 70 and to move
toward the "purified republic" within which our legal system can
concentrate upon individual rights uncorrupted by the legacy of a sordid
history.
CONCLUSION
In an attempt to rectify the effects of years of racial discrimination, the
Supreme Court will, in the twenty-first century if not before, clearly affirm
the constitutionality of affirmative action programs. The doctrinal
inconsistencies that led the Court to use one approach to historical sex-
based discrimination and another to discrimination based upon race will
not survive the test of time.
Age restrictions on continued employment will be eliminated in due
course. If ability to do the job is to be key, then measuring the individual
in particular, and not groups of individuals in general, should and will be
the appropriate standard.
Handicapped persons almost always receive our sympathetic
attention. With maturity, we may even be able to move from sympathy to
acceptance and understanding of them as individuals and more rapidly
require the elimination of impediments to their utilization of all of their
skills.
My most optimistic prediction for the future is the elimination of
employment barriers based upon sex. The steady march of women in
education, in determination, and in participation in all areas portends an
early demise of stereotypical impediments. Choice and ability will reign
supreme. We may in the twenty-first century even become mature enough
to deal fairly with the issue of sexual preference.
All of these optimistic projections are heavily dependent upon the
economic well-being of the nation. If jobs become scarce, sharing the
burdens will become nearly impossible. People seem no more likely to be
generous in hard times than three dogs are likely to share one bone.
Therefore, to solve the problems of invidious job discrimination we must
also address the larger economic and social issues.
70. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
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